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Summary 
The hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa whose incomes have increased 
over the last decade or so have been called the 
“new middle classes” of the developing world. This 
group is getting bigger. Their unprecedented size 
— likely to reach the billions by mid-century — 
means that these new middle classes will play an 
important role in their countries and beyond.  
If we define the middle classes as those who spend 
between US$ 10 and 100 (purchasing power par-
ity, PPP) per day, by some projections this group 
will grow by more than one billion people in Asia 
alone in the next decade. The new middle classes 
will dwarf the “old” ones soon, shifting the centre 
of gravity of world consumption.  
In the West, the middle classes are seen as a huge 
part of the success story of the post-war years. 
They are considered fundamental for sustained 
economic growth, democracy and good political 
institutions. If this happens in developing coun-
tries, then it will be good news. But will it? A sim-
ple replay of history is unlikely.  
We do not know how society will change as in-
comes grow for millions of people in the develop-
ing world.  
The new middle classes could become forces for 
political, economic and social change both domes-
tically and globally. But the opposite can also hap-
pen: once well established, they could act conser-
vatively to protect their own positions and prevent 
further social change. This uncertainty presents a 
diverse set of challenges for development policy.  
First, people tend to use up more natural resources 
as they get richer. Reducing the environmental 
footprint of consumption must therefore be a 
global concern. Second, the growth of middle 
classes will not necessarily foster greater social inclu-
sion. Development policy needs to prioritise reduc-
ing inequality as well as promoting growth. Third, 
rising incomes will not automatically lead to West-
ern-style democracy. Open political systems should 
be encouraged regardless of the outcomes of politi-
cal processes. Fourth, improved global governance 
is not a given. International cooperation among 
countries with larger and more assertive middle 
classes may become more difficult and complex. 
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Rates of absolute poverty are falling around the world. 
With declining poverty comes newfound wealth: many 
who previously had nothing now have a little bit. These 
people have been called the “new middle classes” of the 
developing world — and there are good reasons to pay 
attention to them. To be sure, most developing coun-
tries already have a middle class, even if it is relatively 
small. What is different now is the scale. Hundreds of 
millions of people — most of them in Asia, but also in 
Latin America and Africa — will make up the largest 
group of consumers in history.  
Calling this group the new “middle classes” can be mis-
leading. This term has strong cultural, social and politi-
cal connotations; we should be cautious of applying it 
to what, until now, appears as changing income pat-
terns. And yet, regardless of the label, the very scale of 
the phenomenon ought to call our attention. Rising 
incomes worldwide will shake up the markets. Govern-
ments will not be able to ignore changing demands and 
opinions. And the international community – used to 
thinking that rich countries should give money to poor 
countries – will have to reconsider the meaning of in-
ternational development cooperation. Who are these 
new middle classes? Why should we care about them? 
And what could they mean for development policy? 
Who (or what) are the new middle classes? 
There is no clear consensus about how to define the 
middle classes. Class has both economic and social 
aspects, so a starting point is to refer to people who 
belong to a certain income bracket: they are not rich, 
but neither are they very poor. Economists debate the 
specific levels of income that delineate the middle class 
from those above and below them. Some include all 
those who are just above the poverty line — those who 
can spend around US$ 2 per day in many developing 
countries (all values are PPP). Others have proposed 
thresholds of US$ 4, 10 or 20, and upper limits from 
US$ 4 to 100 of income per day.   
Such a broadly defined group is not homogenous. 
Some people in the new middle classes are near-poor 
while others are well-off. Moreover, the income ranges 
used in some of these definitions are low by Western 
standards: in Germany, for example, someone earning 
less than US$ 36 per day would be considered poor. Yet 
in poor countries, even small increases in income can 
have a considerable effect on a person’s purchasing 
power. Some extra income is used to buy non-basic 
goods, but most of it is channelled towards improving 
health, education and housing. 
The scale of the phenomenon is unprecedented. If we 
define middle classes as those whose daily expenditures 
range between US$ 10 and 100, then by some projec-
tions this group will grow by more than one billion 
people in Asia alone in the next decade. The new middle 
classes are likely to outnumber the “old” ones in the 
not-too-distant future (Figure 1). The centre of world 
consumption — and not just its population — is clearly 
moving away from the West. 
 
Why should we care about the new middle 
classes? 
We care about the growing middle classes in developing 
countries because we expect a lot from them. Why? In 
Western countries, the middle classes have been a main 
social, economic and political point of reference, par-
ticularly since the Second World War. Wealthy countries 
from Canada to Japan take pride in being largely a mid-
dle class society. This is not just about economic pros-
perity: the middle class is seen as part and parcel of an 
inclusive, democratic and well-governed society.   
If something remotely like this were to happen in the 
developing world, it would have enormous conse-
quences. The numbers tell us that the economic out-
look is improving for vast numbers of people. And yet 
the label “middle class” implies much more. The follow-
ing features are commonly associated with the Western 
middle classes. They give us a set of reference points to 
the possible role of middle classes in shaping the futures 
of their countries and of the global community. 
Prosperity and consumption: Up to about 60 per cent 
of the populations of Western Europe, North America, 
Australasia and Japan could be defined as middle class. 
This means that most people in society can enjoy rela-
tively comfortable living standards, including decent 
jobs, health care and annual holidays. This comfort, 
however, has been environmentally costly. The prosper-
ity of the middle classes is intensive in terms of their 
consumption of natural resources and services. 
Inclusiveness: The middle classes embody a social con-
tract in which economic and political power are shared 
and subject to public scrutiny. In many wealthy coun-
tries, this creates a feeling of “classlessness”: everyone is 
subject to the law, no-one should feel inferior to anyone 
else and everyone can identify with common values. 
Middle-class people share a sense of social responsibility 
through paying taxes, and they expect the state to 
provide infrastructure, education and social services.  
Figure 1:  The changing regional share of the global 
 middle class* 
 
*Those with daily expenditures between US$ 10 and 100. 
Source:  Kharas (2010) 
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Political transformation: Thanks in part to the broad 
middle class, liberal democracy became the dominant 
form of political system in the developed world in the 
20th century. This process also meant transforming 
public institutions to make them more transparent and 
accountable, and for balancing against undemocratic 
forces, including those of the market. 
Peace: Comfortable, well-governed countries tend not 
to fight each other, but prefer to cooperate. This has led 
to a global web of institutions for maintaining peaceful 
international relations. The Western middle classes have 
entrenched these values politically as well as dissemi-
nated them through soft power, as expressed in film, 
music and other forms of popular culture. 
This list is not exhaustive, and these features do not 
apply everywhere. “Middle class” has become a slippery 
term even in wealthy countries, where the recent finan-
cial and unemployment crisis has prompted debates 
about the erosion of the middle class. Even before the 
crisis hit, many oft-touted “middle class characteristics” 
were as much myth as reflections of reality. And yet this 
ideal is our reference for assessing the potential signifi-
cance of the new global middle classes.  
What are the implications of the new middle 
classes for development policy? 
Rising incomes are important for development, but they 
are not enough. Development also involves changes in 
social structures, institutions and human capabilities. The 
rise of middle classes has been described in terms of in-
comes and growth; we should not assume that other 
things will inevitably follow. In particular, we do not 
know whether middle classes will become forces for 
change or whether, once established, they will act to 
protect their own positions. 
This uncertainty presents diverse challenges for devel-
opment policy. In thinking about the significance of the 
new middle classes, we need to be cautious not to as-
sume the inevitability of history, yet be able to foresee 
some likely trends. Policy makers can begin to consider 
options for action in the following four key areas. 
Consumption patterns and their implications for eco-
logical sustainability: Until recently, a relatively small 
proportion of the world’s population has been respon-
sible for the biggest burden on natural resources and 
ecosystems, but this is likely to change. An increasingly 
large and wealthy global middle class is bound to have 
an effect on the environment that, by comparison, will 
dwarf that of the Western middle classes. The dispos-
able incomes of the majority of the new middle classes 
may be lower, but the numbers are much bigger. 
There is no easy way to predict the environmental 
impact of this heterogeneous group of new consum-
ers. Some see a doomsday coming if all Chinese and 
Indian households pursue a lifestyle similar to that of 
the US middle class. Yet, on the other hand, the mid-
dle classes are likely to be better educated and, as  
a result, much more conscious about the consequences  
of their consumption. How the new consumers define 
what a “good life” means is an open — yet crucial — 
question. 
For development policy, the main implication is that the 
pursuit of sustainable lifestyles cannot be exclusive to 
the developed world. Reducing the environmental 
footprint of consumption must be a global concern, 
and developing countries must figure prominently. 
Facilitating technology transfer and leapfrogging old 
technologies are solutions within reach. Incentives to 
reduce and to “green” energy consumption and im-
prove the efficiency of agricultural production will be 
central to managing growing numbers of consumers. A 
more fundamental redefinition of prosperity may be 
needed. 
Inclusiveness: In parts of the developing world, eco-
nomic growth co-exists with clientelist networks that 
crowd out inclusive institutions. Some members of the 
“old” middle and elite classes are more interested in 
preserving their positions than in paying taxes and 
sharing the benefits of growth. Moreover, the persis-
tence of high inequality in emerging economies – to-
gether with the relatively small share of national income 
of their middle classes – suggests that the richest 5 per 
cent are likely to continue to preserve their current 
status.  
Global development will be increasingly about distribu-
tion within countries rather than wealth transfers be-
tween rich and poor countries. The implication for pol-
icy is clear: reducing inequality is as important as pro-
moting growth. An important step towards achieving 
this aim is to promote progressive taxation, inclusive 
health and education systems, and stable, formal jobs. 
Political participation: The political role of the new 
middle classes in their countries will probably take many 
different forms. In some cases, the middle class will be a 
progressive driver of political change; in others it will try 
to preserve the status it has acquired and prevent fur-
ther change. Regional differences are already evident. In 
India the future world’s largest middle class is growing 
in a country with a long tradition of mass political par-
ticipation. In China, history’s most remarkable instance 
of poverty eradication, the middle class grows under the 
watchful eye of one-party rule. While governance is 
improving in many African countries and elections have 
become more frequent, it is not yet clear whether rising 
wealth is leading to genuine democratic change. As 
Figure 2 suggests, political values cannot simply be 
extrapolated from different levels of income. 
We cannot expect that the growth of middle classes will 
lead automatically to democracy, but some sort of 
political change is likely and development policy needs 
to pay close attention. Democracy requires transparent 
and effective institutions, accountability of officials, and 
political checks and balances. While these should be 
encouraged, they take different forms in different na-
tional contexts. Development actors need to accept 
political transition as long as it is open, even if they do 
not agree with some aspects of the outcomes.  
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Figure 2: The complicated relationship between 
 income and political values 
 
Sources: Pew Research Center (2009); World Bank online 
 database data 
International cooperation: One of the big open ques-
tions for international cooperation is whether the new 
middle classes will be willing or able to pressure their 
governments to cooperate peacefully with others. Most 
current institutions for international cooperation were 
promoted by countries with large middle classes. Sup-
port for the idea of internationalism (or cooperation 
beyond borders) was crucial for this process. But the 
combination of rising incomes, differing domestic po-
litical systems and cultural diversity may change the 
nature of these international arrangements. We do not 
know if the middle classes in countries as diverse as 
Brazil, India and China will consider international coop- 
eration to be good and necessary. In any case, and re-
gardless of the type of political system, governments 
will not be able to ignore their opinions.  
What does this mean for development policy? Rising 
middle classes may pressure their leaders to cooperate 
peacefully, benefiting global governance. However, 
peaceful cooperation may become more difficult and 
complex as more countries with large and assertive 
middle classes try to influence international processes. 
For example, the electoral victory of the transnational 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt raises the prospect of a 
different type of cooperation from the Western, liberal 
model. Although there are clear common interests in 
resolving global cooperation issues like climate change, 
trade, capital flows, biodiversity, energy and food secu-
rity, there are numerous potential conflicts of interest 
over resources and global influence. The upcoming 
negotiations on a global development partnership to 
follow the Millennium Development Goals after 2015 
will provide a test case for cooperation among countries 
with growing middle classes. A just and stable interna-
tional order, under which the new middle classes can 
flourish, is unlikely to be any easier to achieve. 
By no means the end of history 
Unsustainable or “green”? Progressive or conservative? 
Inclusive or polarised? Cooperative or isolationist? What 
direction the new middle classes in developing coun-
tries will take is uncertain. But, even if history does not 
repeat, they will be a force to be reckoned with. Increas-
ing our understanding of the new middle classes to 
prepare for what might arise is a good place to start. 
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